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Cahill: No Human Cloning: A Social Ethics Perspective

NO HUMAN CLONING: A SOCIAL ETHICS
PERSPECTIVE
Lisa Sowle Cahill*
This Essay addresses the negative impact of human cloning on the
family, and argues further that market incentives to develop and implement cloning techniques exploit and exacerbate socioeconomic inequities. It suggests that cloning should be prohibited internationally and examines possible routes to that aim. To begin with, it offers some
reflections on the nature of moral argument, and on the role of religion
in public debate.

I. THE NATURE OF THE MORAL ARGUMENT
In bioethics discourse in North America, particularly when public
policy or law is addressed, it is typically assumed that acceptable arguments must meet a standard of rationality, secularity, and empirical
demonstrability (of harm or benefit) that excludes religion.' On this assumption, participants in debate must shed particularistic identities and
commitments and enter into a realm of neutrality in which only what is
rationally self-evident to all, empirically demonstrated, or clearly derived from, and coherent with existing laws and practices, will govern
the public regulation of research and clinical medicine. Interestingly, the
moral value that is most often held up as most self-evidently primary is
autonomy.2 While liberty and privacy, upon which that autonomy is

* J. Donald Monan, S.J. Professor of Theology, Boston College. An earlier version of the
present Essay was presented as testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
("NBAC") on March 13, 1997.
I. Cf LINELL ELIZABETH CADY, RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND AMERIcAN PUBLIc LIFE 2
(1993) (contending that "[u~nder the ruse that we are a secular, pluralistic society, various forces
have succeeded in excluding an appeal to religion or religiously based values in determining our
laws and policies").
2. See Bernadette Tobin, Did You Think About Buying Her a Cat? Some Reflections on the
Concept of Autonomy, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 417, 421 (1995) (criticizing theorists

who contend that autonomy is supreme).
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based, are certainly key to the political and legal traditions of the United
States,3 they do not enjoy similar privileged status worldwide and in all
cultures.4 The special articulation they have received in this country is in
fact deeply rooted in historical and cultural experiences, informed by
commitments to freedom of worship and religious toleration, that for the
nation's "founding fathers" were tied to religious identity.
The assumption that public moral discourse requires a communityneutral status for all admissible value commitments is already eroding
in the United States. For instance, the 1997 cloning report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission ("NBAC") took religiouslybased moral considerations to be of public concern.' Introducing its
chapter on "Religious Perspectives," NBAC suggested that several different religious communities share concerns about responsible dominion
over nature, human dignity and destiny, procreation, and family life.'
Noting that such commitments do not necessarily depend on religious
authority, NBAC also expressed interest in understanding how they
could contribute to "a broader societal discussion." 7
Nevertheless, the following chapter, on ethics, seems to reinstate
liberty as the key ethical consideration.8 The freedom of researchers and
of individual couples who might choose to reproduce should be curtailed only in the presence of a clear and urgent danger to society. The
chapter notes, somewhat paradoxically, that there is no single "moral
theory" on which all agree, that can govern public debate. Yet autonomy
becomes the fallback position (as if its priority were not also the product
of an ethical "theory" grounded in a particular history and moral vision
of the good society). Other kinds of arguments about the unacceptability
of cloning are described as deriving from "moral intuition," in a way
that the belief that autonomy is key apparently does not.9
At the same time, this chapter commendably acknowledges that the
value of autonomy is nested in a particular political tradition, that there
3. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Right of Privacy: Past,Present,and Future, 16 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 403,403-04 (1989).
4. See Gerald Dworkin, Privacy and the Law, in PRIVACY 113, 114-15 (John B. Young ed.,
1978) (discussing the difficulties in defining privacy and the assertion that there is no express right
to privacy under English law).
5. See 1 NATIONAL BIOETHIcs ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOET-HCs ADVISORY CoMMissIoN 37 (1997)
[hereinafter CLONING HUMAN BEINGS].
6. See id. at 42-49.
7. Id at 37.
8. See id at 59.
9. See id at 69 (explaining the fear opponents of somatic cell nuclear cloning have that any
children resulting from clones will be regarded as objects rather than persons).
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are other moral concerns on the table that might conceivably carry policy weight, and support restriction of liberty, and that a clear ethical
analysis of cloning as a social practice is difficult to achieve.'0 In the
end, NBAC recommends a temporary ban on federal funding for human
cloning, along with an exhortation to privately funded researchers to
abstain." NBAC grounds this recommendation, not in the ostensibly
elusive values of family and noncommodification of procreation, but in
the physical harm to children that might
2 result from cloning in this early
stage of the technique's development.
Overall, the NBAC report gives a sense that the Commissioners
were in fact sympathetic to ethical and social values beyond liberty and
harm, and that these values influenced their decision to recommend at
least a temporary ban on federally funded cloning. Yet, they were
caught between a model of moral reasoning that is logical, deductive,
probative, empirically substantiated, and "neutral"; and a model that is
affective and emotional as well as logical; that is inductive, experiential,
cumulative, consensual, and self-consciously indebted to particular
communities and practices. Religious sensitivities could play a valid
role on the latter model, even if they are not always directly expressed
in the final consensus position. Physical harm would be a counterconsideration in either category, but the more inductive model of reasoning would be better able to take into account general social perceptions, concerns, commitments, and priorities. It could thus ground a
broad-based process of reflection, not limited to logical and empirical
arguments. The more inclusive model of reasoning is also compatible
with the fact that policies about scientific research or clinical practice
can be implemented through several intersecting social institutions, not
just federal regulations and laws.
The "secular reason" model tends to demand a single universally
persuasive line of analysis, concluding in some clear, unequivocal policy or law. 3 The "community consensus" model is multilayered in both

10. See id. at 77-79.
11. See id. at 105 (discussing the NBAC's recommendation that the moratorium on the use
of federal funding for somatic cell nuclear transfers to attempt to create a child be continued).
12. See id.
at 103-04.
13. The "secular reason" model can be described as one which focuses on three main concems with regard to cloning: (I) the elimination of human uniqueness as well as individuality; (2)
concern over the pathological motivations of individuals who desire to clone; and (3) the fear that
medical science has spun dangerously "out-of-control." See Patrick D. Hopkins, Bad Copies: How
Popular Media Represent Cloning as an Ethical Problem, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1998, at 6, 6.
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the warrants upon which it relies and the implementation it requires. 4 A
funding ban on cloning at the federal level could be complemented, for
instance, by public education about the proper social role of medicine,
regulation of private research, professional ethics and standards that
counteract market incentives, reassessment of the moral and social implications of media coverage of science and reproduction, legislation
governing insurance for reproductive therapies, support for reproductive
alternatives like adoption, and better coordination with international
policies on cloning and related issues.
Our assumption that autonomy should hold the most privileged and
central place in moral thinking is a bioethical and public policy problem.' 5 It prevents us from seeing why other values are socially important
and protected, and why certain freely chosen practices are wrong, even
if they do not result in immediate or quantifiable harms, or direct infringement on the options of other free agents. A narrow focus on
autonomy to freely choose personally preferred goals undermines our
ability to talk together about what would go to make up a "good society," and what we can do concretely to move toward one. In addition to
autonomy and individuality, we need to place on the table human goods
like the interdependence of all in the society we create for ourselves and
our children, concern for the well-being of people with less decisionmaking power and options, and restraint in the face of the profit motive.
We need to look at "the scientific imperative" and "free enterprise" in a
broad and humanistic social context including as well as extending beyond the self-interest and self-determination of very talented scientists
and very shrewd entrepreneurs.
Religion can be an important and valid influence in shaping a new
public consensus. Religious themes, symbols, and stories can function
prophetically, or shape and sensitize moral sensibilities in ways that are
neither sectarian nor imperialist. Instead these themes represent an
imaginative response to the human condition and its moral dimensions,
deepening empathy, and expanding solidarity. Religiously inspired
moral insights and commitments need to be tested by justice and the
common good, since it is a tested truth that religion can function in divisive, oppressive, even violent ways.' 6 However, the noncoercive,

14. The "community consensus" model may be described as one which focuses on the fear
that cloning "may disrupt the interconnected web of social values, practices, and institutions that
support the healthy growth of children." CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 5, at 67.
15. See Hopkins, supra note 13, at 9 (describing the fact that much of the opposition to
cloning is grounded in this nation's attitudes about individuality).
16. See, e.g., ALEx BEIN, THE JEWISH QUESTION: BIOGRAPHY OFA WORLD PROBLEM 94-96,
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evocative, prophetic role of religion can be seen, for instance, in Dena
S. Davis's essay in this symposium on the Jewish myth of the "golem"
as an analogue to cloning. 17 It can also be seen in John Paul II's biblically-informed exhortations to global solidarity in making a preferential
option for the poor, and in combating consumerism, materialism, and a
market mentality. 8
The issue is how to join discourse across and among traditions and
come up with some reasonable consensus on a just and humane social
policy. This Essay now addresses two spheres of consideration that are
essential to such a policy. These are the bio-social aspects of identity
represented by the intergenerational family, and the role of market exchange in defining the practices of genetics and assisted reproduction.
II. FAMILY
Up until now, every human child has had two parents. The biological relation between parent and child is a symbol of reproductive, social,
and domestic partnership with great personal and social significance.
Historically and cross-culturally, families in all their variety of cultural
forms have been key institutions for the structuring of societies and the
transmission of knowledge, values, and practices, as well as for training
in moral dispositions such as empathy, fidelity, honesty, and altruism. A
cloned individual will have a biogenetic link to one lineage only. In the
first relatively innocuous cloning cases we might imagine-like an infertile couple using genetic material from one spouse only to create a
child without having to resort to donor gametes-the child will have a
genetic relation. However, he or she will be only one step removed from
both lineages of the cloned parent. Yet, cloning is clearly different from
other types of assisted reproduction, such as in vitro fertilization for ex-

104-05 (Harry Zohn trans., 1990) (discussing Christian degradation, defamation, and persecution
of the Jews); Mary Ann Glendon, Sudan's Unpunished Atrocities, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1998, at
A27 (criticizing the United Nation's silence regarding the Islamic Sudanese government's
"genocidal campaign" against individuals, primarily Christian civilians, "who do not share the
regime's radical Islamic ideology").
17. See Dena S. Davis, Religious Attitudes Toward Cloning: A Tale of Two Creatures,27
HoFsTRA L. RPv. 509, 518-20 (1999) (comparing the Frankenstein myth with the Jewish myth of
the "golem" and concluding that the latter represents a more positive attitude toward "technology
and toward human uses of power").
18. See John Paul II, Respect for Human Rights: The Secret of True Peace (visited Feb. 2,
(declaring
1999) <http:llwww.vatican.valholyfather/j..._xxxii-world-day-for-peace_en.shtml>
that there should be a greater focus in achieving economic solidarity for the world due to the inability of a free market to care for the needs of the world's poor).
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ample."9 The salient intrinsicdifference is that a cloned individual would
have only one genetic parent and be an end-product of one biological
lineage.' No other lineage would be combined with it in the event of the
clone's "conception." This represents a revolution in the nature of human families.
It will be possible in time to develop all-male or all-female genetic
lineages; it will be possible for female lineages to proceed without any
male contribution at all; and it will be possible for one woman to create
her own child, using her own ovum and deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA"). 2' I am far from sure that separating male and female procreation, or making men unnecessary to the procreative process at all, will
work to the ultimate advantage of women, much less to that of human
responsibility for the next generation.
It might be proposed that the appearance of novelty in the oneparent child could be dissolved by considering the child as the twin or
sibling of the originating individual, rather than as his or her offspring
or descendant. It might be plausible in some cases to view the clone of a
child as a sibling, but the clone of an adult, raised in the next generation,
is more properly his or her child.
When an adult contributes the DNA, "parent" is a more adequate
designator than "twin sibling," both because the latter term implies a
common and simultaneous origin; and because kinship terms like
"parent," "child," and "sibling" carry a generational reference as well as
a biological or genetic one. For instance, one's biologically related and
adopted children are easily seen as "siblings" to one another, despite the
genetic discontinuity, but we would find it implausible or even impossible for an adult to adopt a same-age or older adult as his or her "child"
because of the intergenerational component of the parent-child relationship.
19. "In vitro fertilization" is the "process whereby [multiple] ova ... are placed in a medium" and fertilized by the addition of sperm. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 573 (25th
ed. 1990). The resulting zygote is then introduced into the uterus and developed to term. See id.
20. See Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challengesfor Public Policy: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Pub. Health andSafety of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th
Cong. 42 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings](statement of George J. Annas, Edward R. Utley Professor
of Health Law, Boston University) (claiming that "replication of a human by cloning would radically alter the very definition of what a human being is by producing the world's first human with
a single genetic parent"). But see John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1371, 1410 (1998) (claiming that "persons created through nuclear transfer cloning
do have two genetic parents-the same genetic parents as the clone source").
21. Deoxyribonucleic acid is "considered to be the autoreproducing component of chromosomes and of many viruses, and the repository of hereditary characteristics." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICnONARY, supra note 19, at 415, 461.
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This implies that the clone of an existing child, whose parents intended to raise both children in one family unit, might indeed be considered the "sibling" of the original, and could reasonably be regarded as
sharing with the first child the same two parents. However, the moral
issues are not thereby resolved. For one thing, the nature of the sibling
relationship has been changed; and there arises a danger of treating the
second child as a means to an end. Let us address these issues in turn.
A second intrinsic difference between other reproduction technologies and cloning is that the existence of genetic "doubles" (not new
in itself)2 is moved to a new location in the family or kinship structure:
the clone's genetic twin would be older. This is especially significant in
the case in which the clonee is an adult, since the twins would belong to
different generations. This new kinship location of genetic twinning intersects with the danger of "objectification" or means-to-end control of
the child.
A third difference is that, in cloning, the DNA of an existing individual is selected deliberately and in its entirety to be the source of a
new individual, without leaving anything to the chances inherent in ordinary conception. It is not necessarily predestined that such a decision
would always amount to the "objectification" of the child. In the least
problematic case, an infertile couple would simply be trying to have a
child without resorting to a donor, and would like nothing better than to
leave the process to "nature," if only that were possible. However, there
is in conception by cloning, de facto, more "control" over the outcome
than would be the case in nature, more pre-determination of the result,
and hence more danger of an overt or tacit expectation that the product
of the process will look or function in a certain way.
In the case in which the source of the clone is an adult, the genetic
near-identity between parent and child may hinder the ability of both to
see the child as an independent individual, for whom maturity will require separation from the parent and the development of a unique identity. There will be a differential of power and responsibility far exceeding that which would characterize the sibling relationship of natural
twins.' Thus, although because of the age difference, there would actually be less compromise of individuality than with an identical, same22. A clone is "a precise copy of a molecule, cell, or individual plant or animal." CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 5, at app. A-1.
23. Identical twins differ from clones in several respects: (1) they begin at the same time; (2)
they share the same intrauterine environments; and (3) because identical twins are born at the same
time, they share the same familial as well as cultural events. See Nancy L. Segal, BehavioralAspects of IntergenerationalHuman Cloning: What Twins Tell Us, 38 JuRIMETRICS 57, 58 (1997).
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age, "natural" twin, the new familial location 24of overlap in identity
might exacerbate issues of separation and control
To return to the case of the "sibling" clone (to replicate a living or
dead child, or to supply body products for an ill sibling), the issue of
genetic identity within greatly unequal power positions in the family
might be diminished, but the objectification or end-means aspect would
certainly become more pronounced.' The plausibility of arguing either
way on this one (clonee alternately as parent or as sibling) is probably
an indicator in itself of the potential of this technique to disrupt and
change our notions of family radically, and especially to upset the distinction of and relations between generations26 which are constitutive of
the very meaning of "family" crossculturally.
The child who is truly the child of a single parent is a genuine
revolution in human history, and his or her advent should be viewed
with immense caution. Arguably, it is not too strong to say that cloning
is a violation of the essential reality of human family and of the nature
of the socially related individual within it. We all take part of our identity, both material or biological and social, from combined ancestral
kinship networks. The existing practice of "donating" gametes when the
donors have no intention to parent the resulting child is already an affront to this order of things. However, in such cases, as in cases of
adoption where the rearing of a child within its original combinedfamily network is impossible or undesirable, the child can still in fact
claim the dual-lineage origin that characterizes every other human being. This kind of ancestry is an important part of the human sense of self
(as witnessed by searches for "biological" parents and families), as well
as a foundation of important human relationships. Cloning would create
an unprecedented rupture in those biological dimensions of embodied
humanity, which have been most important for social cooperation.
III. MARKET EXCHANGE AND COMMODIFICATION
Treating others as means to the ends of those with more status,
privilege, and power is represented in a particularly clear way by the
24. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? ConstitutionalChallenges to Bans on

Human Cloning, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 643, 655 (1998) (discussing the fact that "[c]loning could
undermine human dignity by threatening the replicant's sense of self and autonomy").
25. For example, due to the distinct beginnings of a clone, unreasonable expectations may
develop about him or her. See id. at 653. Specifically, when a clone is constructed from a dead
child, "the parents might expect the second child to be a replacement for the first." Id.
26. See id. at 656 (explaining how cloning may bring about harmful changes to the institution of the family).
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dominance of the market in issues of human dignity and human life.
Some prescient bioethicists, such as Daniel Callahan and Lori Andrews,
went on record after the formation of NBAC to predict that economic
incentives will control when humans will be cloned, not any supposed
ban.21 Kirkpatrick Sale wrote a frightening and impressive editorial for
the New York Times entitled Ban Cloning? Not a Chance.2 To illustrate
the cult of progress which ensures that science will proceed with little
conscience and few restraints, Sale quoted the makers of the atomic
bomb. "'When you see something that is technically sweet you go ahead
and do it,"' 2 9 and "'[t]echnological possibilities are irresistible to
man,' '"3 said Robert Oppenheimer and John von Neumann
(respectively).
History teaches us that every instance of human "progress" creates
an equal and opposite opportunity for moral and social "regress." Let us
not be naive: neither nuclear power nor new genetic technologies like
cloning are intrinsically beneficent instruments for the improvement of
the human lot. Although many are still committed to the proposition
that human decisions and policies can be influenced by reasonable public discourse about values, there is a quickly rising level of pessimism
about self-interest as the overriding motivator of human behavior. The
doctrine of "original sin" is a religious symbol which springs all too
readily to the mind of the theologian.31
According to 1998 news reports, a chemist from Lyons, France,
Brigitte Boisselier, runs a World Wide Web home page for a Bahamasbased operation called "Clonaid." 32 For $200,000 each, Clonaid promises individuals cloning services in order to have a child. 33 Ms. Boisselier has an agent in Nevada, and intends to meet prospective clients in
Third World countries "to avoid ... any possible official interference

27. See Lisa Seachrist, Bioethics Experts Sort Out Limits of Genetic Engineering,
BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7882280; see also Tim Radford,
Soundbites: The Clone and the Bill of Rights, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 19, 1998, at 13 (referring
to Lori Andrews).
28. See Kirkpatrick Sale, Ban Cloning? Not a Chance, N.Y. TImES, Mar. 7, 1997, at A35
(contending that "iin a world that not only permits but also commodifies gene-splicing, amniocentesis and in vitro fertilization, there cannot be any lasting legal restraints on any breakthrough
in reproductive technology").
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Gabriel Daly, Original Sin, in THE NEw DIcrIoNARY OF THEOLOGY 727, 727-31
(Joseph A. Komonchak et al. eds, 1987).
32. See August Gribbin, Human Cloning Draws Nearer as Ethicists Seek to Draw Rules,
WASH. TrMEs, Nov. 9, 1998, at Al.
33. See id.
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that might be encountered elsewhere."" 4 Says Ms. Boisselier of applicants: "'They are willing to pay, and they want to be the first ones
cloned."' 35 Although Clonaid and its sponsors may be unrealistic renegades, the market and hence investment interest in cloning and other
genetic innovations is real. The American Stock Exchange biotechnology index jumped higher by fifty percent in twelve weeks in the fall of
1998.36 And a variant on the same theme is the irresistible attraction of
research prestige via landmark discoveries.
Research with public funding is easier to control and less marketdriven than private research, but the sphere of control is quite limited.
Privately funded research would be motivated by foreseeable profits,
and success in marketing the results would easily overtake other ethical
considerations. Projections of "great gains for mankind in curing disease" are equally projections of great profits for investors. Consider already existing parallels in the manufacture and pricing of drugs; the operation of health maintenance organizations; and the pricing and
advertising of infertility therapies. In all of these, the profit motive is
concealed behind a facade of beneficence and "medical miracles." In all
of these cases, the actual practices which have resulted are often unfair
and discriminatory, and certainly not governed by considerations of the
common good. The authors of an essay aptly titled Homo Economicus
conclude in a lament that "the encroachment of commercial practices on
the human body is increasingly challenging individual and cultural values, encouraging exploitation through the collection and use of tissue,
and turning tissue (and potentially people) into marketable products.""
In an essay in this symposium, Lee M. Silver eloquently expresses
similar concerns.l He notes as a matter of human and cultural fact that
people want to have babies and want to give them all the advantages in
life they can afford." In the absence of restrictions on other ways the
wealthy equip their children for a privileged life (healthcare, education,
and cultural assets), it is difficult to envision limits on the marketing of
benefits like genetic enhancement, projected to be available soon via

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Justin Gillis, Biotech Shares Now Outpacing the Dow, BUFFALo NEwS, Nov. 17,
1998, at E3.
37. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Homo Economicus: Commercialization of Body Tissue
in the Age of Biotechnology, HASTINGS CENTR REP., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 30, 38.
38. See Lee M. Silver, How Reprogenetics Will Transform the American Family, 27
HOFSTRA L. REv. 649 (1999).
39. See id. at 656.
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"reprogenetics." Although human reproductive cloning implies the
duplication of parental DNA and not its enhancement, cloning as a reproductive technique could be marketed to the wealthy; stem-cell research using cloned embryonic cells could produce marketable remedies
for disease; and cloned siblings could be produced as matched tissue
donors for the children of the well-to-do. Not only would the poor and
uninsured be excluded from these choices, they may well continue to
lack basic health care and other important necessities like decent public
education.
This scenario raises anew an old issue: distributive justice in access
to social benefits, not limited to medical and reproductive treatments. It
might be argued that genetic benefits are unlike other assets, in that they
affect the physical being of a person in profound and unalterable ways,
passing ineluctably to future generations. However, whether or not
cloning presents any unique moral dilemmas in this regard, the global
marketing of cloning virtually outside of social limits certainly leads to
a biotechnology climate in which financial incentives to pander to individual preferences, without regard for their aggregate effect on the social body, are quickly outpacing moral and regulatory restraints. In this
case, Jeremy Rifkin's apocalyptic worries do not sound far-fetched:
"Together, genes, biotechnologies, life patents, the global life-science
industry, human-gene screening and surgery, the new cultural currents,
computers, and the revised theories of evolution are beginning to remake our world.'41 Certainly, cutting off federal money will not be a
deterrent to the cloning of humans. Stronger measures and more profound attention to our social values and the way we express, promote,
and change them, will be required.
Self-interest is not always base, profit is not always exploitative,
and the market may provide an efficient and salutary way for human
beings to exchange goods and services to their mutual benefit. This is
true in the realms of science, medicine, and technology, and, to a lesser
extent, in sex, marriage, and family. The problem of social ethics is to
place the self-interested behavior of the market within certain limits, so
that it neither overrides other types of reciprocal relationships, nor
achieves undue incursions into spheres of life that should be governed at
least as much by duty, respect, fidelity, and compassion as by maximization of profit. One important moral restraint on the market is a com-

40. See id. at 657.
41. JERFY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE
WORLD 10 (1998).
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munal duty to provide basic or essential goods and services to all, including those who cannot achieve for themselves through free exchange. This limit derives from the fact of human interdependence,
paired with recognition of a basic human dignity or equality. This latter
value of equality already undergirds the moral legitimacy of markets as
an arena in which persons can exercise their liberty in disposing of and
profiting from the fruits of their labor.
Individual autonomy and the goals and preferences of individuals
must often be subordinated to the common good, as defined incrementally and collaboratively by all those who participate in or stand to be
affected by it.42 Market behavior is constrained in United States medical
research and practice, for instance, through the prohibition of sales of
organs and embryos, 43 and the disproportionate compensation of research subjects.' Serious limitation of the market in cloning would require several tiers of action: for example, withholding of federal funds,
a general legislative ban on all cloning, denial of insurance coverage to
persons who reproduce by cloning, and direct regulation of the infertility business. However, market commodification of cloning and other
biotechnologies is not a social concern that the United States can solve
4
alone.
One important barrier to the effective moral restraint of biotechnology, including cloning, however, is the globalization of the industry. 46 As illustrated in the claims and aims of Clonaid, national and regional restrictions still permit escape to less heavily regulated areas of
the globe. Indeed, reproductive free-market nations such as Italy and the
United States now serve as havens for entrepreneurs who want to avoid
bans or funding restrictions on ventures such as the technologicallyassisted impregnation of postmenopausal women. The reproduction experts in these societies also attract the elites of countries whose general
level of economic development cannot support local refinement of the
42. See Daniel R. Finn, John Paul 11 and the Moral Ecology of Markets, 59 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 662, 676-77 (1998).
43. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 37, at 32-33 (discussing the landmark case Moore v.
Regents of the University of California,793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)).
44. See id. (discussing how scientists were able to exploit the unique cell structure of a research subject for millions while the subject received nothing).
45. See Karen Lebacqz, Fair Shares:Is the Genome ProjectJust?, in GENETICS: ISSUES OF
SOCIAL JusTICE 82, 83-85 (Ted Peters ed., 1998) (discussing the significance of the international
community in issues involving the development of biotechnologies); RiFiuN, supra note 41, at 810 (explaining how the emergence of a new "operating matrix" will play a pivotal role in shaping
mankind's relationship with the world).
46. "A global life-science industry is already beginning to wield unprecedented power over
the vast biological resources of the planet." RIFEN, supranote 41, at 9.
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more exotic methods of reproductive control.
The regulation of biotechnology, including genetics and cloning,
requires more than a national approach, even a multi-pronged one. On
other issues of urgent global concern, such as the environment, ethnic
conflict, and human rights, it has proved necessary for regional and international bodies or alliances to cooperate in seeking solutions. One
approach is through the United Nations ("UN"), conceived as a forum
through which nation-states, through their representatives, act as individual agents in coming to agreement and action with other sovereign
states. However, the ability of markets to function outside the scope of
existing national and international legislation suggests that more complex approaches to regulation are necessary. In an article for the 75th
anniversary issue of Foreign Affairs, Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests
that the "liberal internationalism" that produced the United Nations is
no longer adequate to the real "new world order.' 47 Her thesis is that
states are disintegrating into functionally distinct parts that are interacting with their counterparts around the globe, rather than through the
agency of the state as such. 48 The emerging "transgovernmental networks" can actually help enhance the status of states in international life
by "ensuring that specific state institutions derive
strength and status
' 49
from participation in a transgovernmental order.
Disaggregating the state into its functional components makes it
possible to create networks of institutions engaged in a common enterprise even as they represent distinct national interests. "Moreover, they
can work with their subnational and supranational counterparts, creating
a genuinely new world order in which networked institutions perform
the functions of a world government-legislation, administration, and
adjudication-without the form."5 °
How does this or can this work for biotechnology, "reprogenetics,"
and cloning? Much of the necessarily complicated answer to that question exceeds the scope of this Essay, however, that national regulatory
bodies like NBAC, as well as the courts and legislatures, could be paying more attention to their counterparts in other countries, and especially to the policy consensus that regional bodies have achieved elsewhere on related issues.
Although perhaps not exactly "transgovernmental" in Slaughter's
47. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997,
at 183, 183.
48. See id. at 184.
49. Id. at 196.
50. Id. at 195.
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sense in that they act through national representatives, the European
Commission and the Council of Europe have developed policies on both
genetics and embryo research. The latter have the force of law for
member nations that vote to ratify them. These policies tend to be more
restrictive than United States guidelines, to express more concern about
objectification of human persons, and to invoke social concerns as a rationale for constraints on science, the market and individual choice.
These European policies complement the recently developed guidelines

of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and an earlier
statement of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. These policies all ban "reproductive" cloning (as does

NBAC), but do not distinguish among funding sources. They encourage
member nations to enact laws that conform to the guidelines, and are

direct in defining such practices as cloning as "ethically unacceptable,"52
in the words of the European Commission." The UN's 1998 "Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights" not only ex-54
cludes the cloning of human beings as "contrary to human dignity,"
but also calls the genome the "heritage of humanity," 5 and in that light,
rules out patenting portions of the genome as such for financial gain, as

well as making profit from human products and tissues. 56 International
professional societies also have provided ethical guidelines for medical
research and practice, attempting to limit the influence of market incen-

tives on research and practice across national borders.57
In conclusion, the international debate about cloning will hopefully
51. For a brief review up through 1997, see Lisa Sowle Cahill, Genetics, Ethics and Social
Policy: The State of the Question, in THE ETHICS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING at vii, vii-xiii
(Maureen Junker-Kenny & Lisa Sowle Cahill eds., 1998); see also F. William Dommel, Jr. &
Duane Alexander, The Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe, 7
KENNEDY INsT. Enucs J. 259, 259 (1997) (comparing the regulations promulgated by the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine with federal regulations controlling research with human subjects).
52. See Cahill, supra note 51, at viii-x.
53. This is a May 1997 Opinion of the European Commission's Group of Advisors on the
Ethical Implications of Biotechnology.
54. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN GENOME AND HUMAN RIGHTS at art. 11 (1997).
55. Id at art.
1.
56. See id. at art. 4.
57. See Christine Grady, Science in the Service of Healing, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.Dec. 1998, at 34, 37 (demonstrating the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences' concerns in its InternationalEthical Guidelinesfor Biomedical Research involving Human
Subjects); see also Leonard H. Glantz et al.,
Research in Developing Countries: Taking "Benefit"
Seriously, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 38, 39 (discussing how in 1992, the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences published guidelines for using research subjects from third world countries).
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lead to profound consideration of questions of the common good; will
resist the technological imperative and market forces; and will engage
moral reflections that go beyond autonomy, informed consent, and even
immediate, identifiable harms to specifiable individuals. It might provide a national and international forum in which to envision the big,
long-range social picture that can be so difficult to regard as a meaningful context of ethical responsibility and action, much less to evaluate. In
the debate about human cloning, Americans may have an opportunity to
begin to create a more reflective, more cautious, more farsighted, less
entrepreneurial and pragmatic social ethos in this country, and to create
networks of biogenetic responsibility and standards of accountability
that join our public concerns to those of other political and cultural
communities.
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